As a platform with a maximum displacement of over 40,000 tons, the Type 075 amphibious assault ship has purposes beyond amphibious warfare, right? The answer is affirmative. Dubbed as “mini aircraft carriers,” Type 075 ships are not just a gimmick.
For a long time, the inadequate amphibious combat capability has been one of the weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. While the Type 072 and Type 073 tank landing ships merely addressed the issue of availability, the Type 071 landing platform dock significantly alleviated the problem of long-distance deployment. However, it wasn’t until the Type 075 amphibious assault ship entered service that the PLA Navy finally filled the last gap in its amphibious combat capabilities, possessing the ability to conduct trans-oceanic landings and provide support.
However, after the Type 075 made its debut, there have been speculations suggesting that this versatile “mini aircraft carrier” would not be limited to amphibious warfare and would inevitably have broader applications.
Recently, with the Eastern Theater Command publicly releasing training footage of the Type 075 ship Anhui, these speculations have been partially confirmed. Two Ka-28 and four Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters were seen simultaneously on the deck of the Anhui ship.
This development indicates that in addition to amphibious landings and aerial support, the Type 075 is likely to carry a large number of helicopters in the future, forming anti-submarine helicopter carrier formations. These formations could cooperate with land-based anti-submarine patrol aircraft in the East China Sea, South China Sea, or the Philippine Sea to establish dedicated anti-submarine interception networks targeting the United States, Japan, South Korea, and even Australia.
Anti-submarine warfare is a challenge faced by navies worldwide. Since the 1990s, the PLA Navy has devoted significant efforts and resources to developing a shipborne anti-submarine system centered around destroyers, submarines, and land-based aircraft. However, this system still lacks flexibility, particularly in long-range anti-submarine operations. The combination of Type 075 ships and anti-submarine helicopters partially fills this gap in the PLA’s anti-submarine warfare system.
The reason behind the PLA’s establishment of a comprehensive and massive anti-submarine warfare system lies in the submarine threats in its vicinity. Both the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian regions have significant submarine activities, with even the Australian Navy considering the waters around China as a potential battleground.
Especially after the effectiveness of anti-access/area denial tactics has been proven, the United States believes that carrier-centered intervention strategies are no longer reliable. Instead, it advocates using nuclear submarines as the main force for intervention in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. The AUKUS agreement to provide and support nuclear submarines for Australia, the encouragement of Japan to build more AIP submarines, and even the Philippines’ plan to acquire submarines are all manifestations of the United States’ attempt to disrupt the Indo-Pacific situation with submarines at its core.
This is not a distant issue. Although Australia is still years away from acquiring nuclear submarines, U.S. think tanks have already included scenarios of U.S. Navy nuclear submarine intervention in the Taiwan Strait situation, attacking the PLA landing fleet in their war games. It is highly probable that if the Australian military acquires nuclear submarines, they will serve similar purposes and tactics.
Japan continues to maintain a pace of launching at least one large AIP submarine per year. These submarines, capable of long-duration submerged operations, pose a significant threat after being equipped with cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles. The Duterte administration has recently approved plans to purchase the first submarine, and France, South Korea, and Spain are eager to become the first sellers of submarines to the Philippines.
This is the current maritime warfare situation around China. On the surface, with the PLA’s anti-access system beginning to demonstrate its power and the imminent commissioning of the third aircraft carrier, the outcome seems inevitable. However, underwater warfare is becoming increasingly intense and complex. Countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia are racing to develop underwater equipment, while Western countries are planning to intervene at any time. In such an environment, it is natural for the PLA to focus on establishing an anti-submarine warfare system, especially with powerful aerial anti-submarine capabilities.
It’s often said that the best way to counter a weapon is with the same weapon. However, the inherent characteristics of submarines determine that anti-submarine warfare is not very efficient. Submarines have relatively weak situational awareness underwater, so using submarines to counter submarines is like two blind people fencing; efficiency is unlikely to be high.
During World War II, the German U-boat fleet employed the “wolf pack” tactic, which at one point nearly brought Britain to collapse. However, when the United States freed up production capacity and deployed a large number of escort carriers into the Atlantic, the threat posed by German submarines rapidly declined.
It is this experience that led the United States to attach great importance to aerial anti-submarine warfare after the war. Not only did it deploy anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters on aircraft carriers, but it also agreed to Japan’s construction of so-called helicopter destroyers to maximize the elimination of the threat posed by Soviet and Chinese nuclear submarines. From the early “Hinata” and “Shiranui” classes to the current “Hyuga” and “Izumo” classes, which are no different from light aircraft carriers, the United States has attempted to block Chinese and Soviet nuclear submarines in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.
Today, the offense and defense have changed. The U.S. military cannot guarantee the survival of aircraft carriers in wartime and can only rely on nuclear submarines and other countries’ conventional submarines as intervention means. The PLA faces a sudden increase in underwater warfare pressure. In coastal areas, the PLA can still rely on shore-based anti-submarine aircraft, Type 056A, and Type 054A frigates to form a three-dimensional anti-submarine network. However, in the waters far from the coast, such as the first island chain and the Philippine Sea, it can only rely on the helicopters carried by the fleet itself.
Undoubtedly, the Type 075 amphibious assault ship is a quite perfect solution. With its large platform, long range, and endurance, with the assistance of Type 052C/D or Type 054A, as long as there are two such fleets, they can establish anti-submarine defense lines to the east of Taiwan Island or in the South China Sea. Moreover, the farther away this defense line is from the coastline or the theater, the better.
At the same time, the establishment of specialized anti-submarine fleets allows carrier strike groups to not worry about threats from underwater, focusing all their attention on regional air defense and the contest for sea control, undoubtedly further enhancing the overall combat power of the navy.
Of course, the lineup of two Ka-28s and four Z-9Cs in the training footage released by the Eastern Theater Command this time is still somewhat inadequate. The former is a Soviet-era anti-submarine helicopter, and the latter is a 4-ton-class helicopter. One has limited onboard system technology, and the other has a low takeoff weight, which is somewhat of a compromise for a 40,000-ton-class “mini aircraft carrier” like the Type 075.
However, carrying Z-18F and Z-20F helicopters on the Type 075 is also entirely feasible, which would increase the efficiency of anti-submarine warfare and expand the operational radius. The PLA is gradually building a more comprehensive and deterrent anti-submarine defense line, and it seems to be only a matter of time.