Medvedev made a surprise visit to Beijing without any prior warning.
As the global security situation changed dramatically, Russian President Vladimir Putin immediately sent his close ally, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, to visit China.
Neither the Chinese nor Russian diplomatic departments released the news of Medvedev’s visit to China in advance. It was not until Medvedev’s special plane landed in China at night that Russian official media such as TASS issued a brief report. The Russian media only made it clear that Medvedev would visit China for two days and that Medvedev planned to meet with the highest level of Chinese officials, but did not announce what specifically he was going to discuss.
However, considering that Medvedev is the chairman of the United Russia Party and deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council, it is not difficult to infer that in addition to routine Sino-Russian inter-party exchanges, strategic security issues must be one of the focuses of this round of Sino-Russian high-level communication.
The specific security content discussed can be divided into four main areas.
First, in less than 40 days, the United States will complete the change of government, and Trump will return to the White House after four years. By then, the United States’ international geopolitical strategy will inevitably undergo major changes, and the external environment that China and Russia will each face will also inevitably change.
The Russian side should have already made its own speculation about the possible direction of the situation after Trump takes office. Now, by inviting Medvedev to China, it should be to first give China a hint, and then listen to China’s judgment and position on the situation, to ensure the stability of China-Russia cooperation in areas such as security.
The second issue should be nuclear safety. The Russian government has adjusted its nuclear safety doctrine, lowered the threshold for using nuclear deterrence, and used new medium-range ballistic missiles to strike targets in Ukraine after the Biden administration lifted restrictions on the use of weapons to aid Ukraine.
Although Russia’s actions can be attributed to countermeasures launched in response to changes in the external situation, Moscow is also aware that its adjustments in the field of nuclear strategy are actually not conducive to the improvement of the international nuclear security situation. Russia needs to explain its true strategic bottom line to China as soon as possible and seek more consensus with China on the issue of nuclear arms control.
This is also an extended impact of China’s convening of a meeting of nuclear safety experts from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in Dubai about a week ago to promote exchanges among the five permanent members on nuclear safety issues.
The third security issue that China and Russia may discuss is the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
The martial law launched by South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol led to violent turmoil in South Korea’s domestic political situation and added many variables to the future direction of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
The situation on the peninsula is a matter of great concern. Once chaos breaks out on the peninsula, China and Russia, also countries in Northeast Asia, are likely to be dragged in. Russia needs to understand China’s attitude towards the situation on the peninsula through high-level communication.
Moreover, just after Yoon Seok-yeol’s operation failed, Russia and North Korea held a ceremony in Moscow to formally exchange the instruments of ratification of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries. Thus, the military alliance agreement signed by Russia and North Korea in June this year officially came into effect. Russia also needs to inform China of the relevant situation. China will naturally not miss this opportunity to directly understand the adjustment of Russia’s Northeast Asia strategy.
The last thing China and Russia want to discuss is some international issues of common concern to both sides, in addition to the situation on the peninsula, with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the situation in the Middle East as the focus.
On the Ukrainian issue, Medvedev is likely to explain to China the Putin government’s current conditions for restarting peace talks and the general requirements for ending the war so that China and other countries can continue to mediate a ceasefire.
On the issue of the Middle East, the fall of the Assad government in Syria has dealt a heavy blow to Russia’s influence in the region, and has also affected the strategic layout of Iran, Russia’s key regional partner.
China and Russia have similar positions on issues in the Middle East, such as Gaza. China has been relatively less affected by the recent changes in the Middle East. Russia will naturally think of exchanging views with China and strive to coordinate with China on issues such as future contacts with the new Syrian government.
It should be added that although TASS and other Russian media have emphasized Medvedev’s identity as vice chairman of the Federal Security Council in their reports, we should not forget that Medvedev is also the leader of Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, and a close ally of Russian President Putin in the political arena.
During his visit to China in December 2022, Medvedev played the role of these two identities. As a messenger, he delivered a handwritten letter from Putin to senior Chinese officials. In subsequent high-level meetings, he emphasized that exchanges and cooperation between the ruling parties are an important part of China-Russia relations, and then discussed with China the issue of strengthening China-Russia strategic docking and comprehensively strengthening cooperation between the two sides in various fields.
Medvedev is likely to continue this line of thought this time, first communicating with China on the issue of inter-party cooperation, and then turning the topic to changes in the security situation, economic cooperation, etc. We can even boldly predict that Medvedev’s visit is intended to pave the way for higher-level communication between China and Russia.
In other words, Medvedev’s low-key visit to China proves that, against the backdrop of sudden changes in the international situation, China and Russia are comprehensively strengthening communication and exchanges, consolidating the momentum of cooperation in many areas such as security, and ensuring that China and Russia cooperate on many international and regional issues. Regardless of what China and Russia can discuss this time, this diplomatic activity itself has been able to send a relatively clear political signal to the outside world.