Recently, a new type of radar ship named “Liaowang 1” appeared online. The ship features multiple large radar systems, radomes, and satellite communication antennas. Functionally, it resembles the 815A electronic reconnaissance ship. However, analysts believe that the 815A electronic reconnaissance ships already meet all of China’s military needs, and with a fleet of nine, it’s unlikely that a new electronic reconnaissance ship with an estimated displacement of 30,000 tons would be introduced at this time.
Thus, this ship is likely intended to match the U.S. Navy’s missile measurement ships, with capabilities such as space tracking and control, rocket trajectory detection, and ballistic route mapping. The appearance of this ship undoubtedly highlights that China has filled the gaps in its national missile defense system, now comparable to the United States. Due to the nature of ballistic flight paths, China doesn’t traverse the Pacific route when traveling to and from North America, as can be inferred from aviation routes and past missile tests.
In reality, both China and Russia primarily use the Arctic route when striking North America, with a critical path through the Arctic Circle and Canadian airspace. Therefore, since the Cold War, the U.S. National Missile Defense Command has been stationed in Canada, known as the “North American Aerospace Defense Command.” To bolster the capabilities and defense of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, Canada possesses advanced radar and sensing equipment, as well as a range of advanced fighter jets. Previously, the interceptors used were F-22s, but due to the production line’s closure and declining maintenance standards, the more efficient F-35s and F-15s have replaced them.
Unlike the U.S., which has inherent geographical advantages, China doesn’t have advanced radar systems deployed near the Arctic Circle to provide sufficient early warning for the activation and interception work of its homeland defense system. The only support China can rely on is Russia’s Siberia, which can provide China with less than eight minutes of missile early warning time. However, for national missile defense, a larger early warning window and greater early warning distance provide more possibilities for missile defense, even enabling mid-course interception if necessary.
The appearance of the Liaowang 1 missile measurement ship first solves the issue of China’s naval fleets’ ultra-long-range missile early warning capability. It can predict the missile’s impact point based on its flight path. If China could develop an X-band fire control radar ship similar to the U.S. Navy’s SBX-1 “Sea-Based X-Band Radar,” it could directly implement the first round of interception.
Of course, such long-range early warning and missile interception capabilities first test China’s navy’s ability to conduct long-distance operations, including fleet offense and defense and logistical support. The main ships involved are icebreakers, aircraft carriers, attack nuclear submarines, and comprehensive supply ships.
Missile measurement ships and X-band fire control radar ships are core components. So far, the Chinese navy has initially acquired this capability but is still not as powerful as the U.S. Currently, China has only initially achieved a complete national missile early warning system, while interception operations are another matter.