The rapid changes in the international game situation have made the possibility of direct military conflict between China and the United States gradually increase. Against this background, there is reason to believe that the People’s Liberation Army and the US military are actually constantly conducting war game simulations in various environments and conditions, trying to find out the advantages and disadvantages in this “paper talk” way.
Judging from the media reports, there have been dozens of such simulations in the past one or two years. If we count those that have not been made public, the number is absolutely astonishing. Recently, the Hong Kong media South China Morning Post reported that the People’s Liberation Army conducted another simulation of being attacked by the US AGM-158C stealth anti-ship missile.
The paper on this exercise was published in the academic journal “Command, Control and Simulation”. The unit is the North China Computer Research Institute, which is the 15th Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation. According to the content quoted by the South China Morning Post, this exercise “aims to enhance the PLA’s confrontation and tactics” and is located in the waters of the Dongsha Islands in the northeast of the South China Sea. The condition is that the US military launches 10 (presumably dozens) AGM-158Cs at the PLA fleet. The result of the exercise is that the PLA fleet successfully implements electronic jamming on these missiles, but the missile still successfully hits a destroyer by switching to thermal imaging guidance mode.
The complete simulation process is much more complicated, but it is impossible to disclose all of it. From the known simulation process, the 15th Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation successfully used computers to simulate the flight trajectory of the AGM-158C, including the entire ballistic change process of the cruise phase and the penetration phase. After detecting the incoming missile, the PLA fleet activated the electronic warfare system to interfere with it, and successfully made the passive guidance radar of the AGM-158C completely ineffective. Then the infrared or thermal imaging guidance system was used as a system backup, and finally successfully hit it.
The AGM-158C, also known as the LRASM stealth anti-ship cruise missile, was manufactured by Lockheed Martin. The project was launched in 2009, flight tests were conducted in 2013, dual-launch target practice was completed in 2017, and it was subsequently tested on multiple platforms of the US Navy and Air Force such as the B-1B bomber and the F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter.
This type of missile is currently equipped with the US military. Its performance is actually remarkable, but the biggest problem is insufficient production capacity. The total number of “RASM” and “RASM-ER” purchased in fiscal year 2024 is only 115, including 50 anti-ship types, while the US military’s “RASM” inventory is only about 134.
Although the number is small, before the actual deployment of hypersonic missiles, this is already the most effective anti-ship weapon in the hands of the US military. If it is launched by the high-altitude and high-speed B-1B or the radar-stealth B-2 and B-21, with a range of about 1,000 kilometers, dozens of “RASMs” are really a threat that cannot be ignored. With this in mind, it is understandable why the PLA has to conduct special response and interception tests.
So does this simulation prove that the PLA Navy is vulnerable to the US stealth anti-ship missiles? The answer is not that simple, because the PLA fleet only implemented electronic jamming, forcing the “RASM” to switch to the infrared guidance mode with a larger theoretical error. According to public information, the “RASM” adopts a composite guidance mode such as inertial/anti-jamming GPS/passive radar/infrared thermal imaging/artificial intelligence analysis. In addition, it can receive target information from other units through data links for adjustment, and has the ability to “fire and forget”.
According to the South China Morning Post, if Rasm can only be guided by the thermal imaging mode, which is less affected by external factors, during the penetration phase, then other guidance modes are almost all ineffective, making it difficult to achieve precise strikes under actual combat conditions.
More importantly, during the entire simulation, all the PLA fleet’s ship-borne air defense missile systems, that is, the hard kill mode, were never put into use, which gave the “RASM” a chance to successfully penetrate the defense – conversely, if the PLA opens any layer of air defense firepower, the probability of “RASM” successfully hitting the target will drop exponentially.
The most significant thing is the simulation itself, because it probably means that the PLA has mastered the electromagnetic and infrared characteristics of “RASM”, as well as key indicators such as speed and trajectory at different stages. Otherwise, it would be unlikely to announce the simulation results so specifically.
This is very interesting because the South China Morning Post used various rhetoric to try to imply that the objectivity of this simulation is difficult to determine. For example, the US military once claimed that the technical parameters and combat methods of “RASM” were confidential, and “the Chinese team claimed that the data came from open source intelligence and long-term accumulation, which is difficult to be independently verified.”
Strictly speaking, this is indeed difficult to verify. The U.S. military will not be stupid enough to actively disclose data to prove whether Rasm is useful. In other words, even if any media asks the U.S. military how it evaluates the simulation of the 15th Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, the answer will definitely be “no comment” or silence. But one thing is certain, the simulation results will definitely make the U.S. military question Rasm, and at least re-evaluate and test it, which will increase the time cost again.
At present, the US military is unable to pay this cost, because the production and procurement plan for the next five years has been determined. After spending $87.8 million to produce 27 “RASMs” in fiscal year 2024, the five-year production plan finally brought the unit price down a little, from $3.24 million to $3.22 million…
According to a report by the U.S. Air Force and Space Force in April last year, the U.S. military plans to spend $1.7 billion to buy Rasm missiles from fiscal years 2025 to 2029. How many missiles will be purchased? 115 missiles in fiscal year 25, 99 missiles in fiscal year 26, 111 missiles in fiscal year 27, and 112 missiles each in fiscal years 28 and 29, for a total of 549 missiles.
It sounds like a lot, but whether the US military has the ability to project it is questionable. The US military bases in the first and second island chains are completely suppressed, and aircraft carriers cannot enter the second island chain in wartime. Sending strategic bombers from Pearl Harbor or the Aleutian Islands is one solution, but how much survivability can it have under the PLA’s comprehensive anti-stealth combat system of sea, land, air and space? Besides, isn’t it too much of a fuss just to throw a few anti-ship missiles? Even if it is successfully launched, the simulation of the 15th Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation also proves that the US military is likely to lose more valuable strategic bombers than steal the chicken.